down to the shabizzle, shizzle.

What differences do you see between 'Fate' and buddha's 'Dependent Origination'?
Wouldn't there be less resistance to 'DO', since it harmonizes the opposing views of Choice and Pre-destiny?

there is no 'do'. I (this ego) is not 'doing' this.

Sorry, my slopp.
'DO' = Paticca-Samuppaada = Dependent Origination.

Thanissaro Bhikkhu's note to his translation of Avijjapaccaya Sutta (the discourse on ignorance as requisite condition):
"In this discourse, the Buddha refuses to answer the question of whether there is anyone or anything lying behind the processes described in dependent origination. When his interlocutor asks, for each factor in the causal process, "Which is the X, and whose is the X?" the Buddha equates this with the assumption that "X is one thing, and it is the X of someone/something else." He then equates this with the proposition, which he has rejected many times elsewhere in the discourses, that the life-principle is one thing, and the body is something else, i.e., that there is something unseen lying behind the visible processes of life. However, the Buddha has also rejected, in as many times, the proposition that the life-principle is the same as the body, i.e., that there is nothing unseen lying behind the visible processes of life. Avoiding these two extremes, he simply drops the question and focuses attention on what is directly perceivable — the way one factor in dependent co-arising functions as a prerequisite for the next. If one were to focus on what might or might not lie behind these factors, one would be tied up in speculations about what, by definition, can never be experienced. But by focusing on the interplay of the factors that are directly perceivable, and — by so doing — developing dispassion for them, one can overcome the craving and ignorance that keep producing stress and suffering, and in that way gain release."

The Avijja-Paccaya Sutta:
[Buddha said]: "From ignorance (avijja) as a requisite condition comes sankhara; from sankhara as a requisite condition comes vinnana;...nama-rupa;...salayatana; ...phassa;...vedana;... tanha;...upadana;...bhava;...birth; from birth as a requisite condition comes aging-&-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering."

When this was said, a certain monk said to the Blessed One: "Which aging & death, lord? And whose is this aging & death?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. If one were to ask, 'Which aging & death? And whose is this aging & death?' and if one were to ask, 'Is aging & death one thing, and is this the aging & death of someone/something else?' both of them would have the same meaning, even though their words would differ. When there is the view that the soul is the same as the body, there isn't the leading of the holy life. And when there is the view that the soul is one thing and the body another, there isn't the leading of the holy life. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata points out the Dhamma in between: From birth as a requisite condition comes aging & death."

"Which birth, lord? And whose is this birth?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth."

"Which bhava, lord? And whose is this becoming?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming."

"Which clinging, lord? And whose is this clinging?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging."

"Which craving, lord? And whose is this craving?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving."

"Which feeling, lord? And whose is this feeling?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling."

"Which contact, lord? And whose is this contact?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact."

"Which are the six sense media, lord, and whose are the six sense media?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From name-&-form as a requisite condition come the six sense media."

"Which name-&-form, lord? And whose is this name-&-form?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-&-form."

"Which consciousness, lord? And whose is this consciousness?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said... "From fabrications as a requisite condition comes consciousness."

"Which fabrications, lord? And whose are the fabrications?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "If one were to ask, 'Which are the fabrications, and whose are the fabrications?' and if one were to say, 'Fabrications are one thing, and these fabrications are something/someone else's,' both of them would have the same meaning, even though their words would differ. When one is of the view that the life-principle is the same as the body, there is no leading the holy life. And when one is of the view that the life-principle is one thing and the body another, there is no leading the holy life. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata points out the Dhamma in between: From ignorance as requisite condition come fabrications. Now from the remainderless fading & cessation of that very ignorance, every one of these writhings & wrigglings & wigglings — 'Which aging & death? And whose is this aging & death?' or 'Is aging & death one thing, and is this the aging & death of someone/something else?' or 'The soul is the same as the body,' or 'The soul is one thing and the body another' — are abandoned, their root destroyed, like an uprooted palm tree, deprived of the conditions of existence, not destined for future arising."

Even if Buddha did share your idea of fate (plausible), he certainly didn't preach it. Fate as you describe it fits Pubbekatahetuvada, the doctine that happiness (sukha), suffering (dukkha), and neutral feelings(adukkham-asukha) result entirely from previous actions. This teaching he avoided because it tended to lack of motivation and effort regarding what should be done and what should not be done.

"Bhikkhus, these three sects, on being questioned by the wise, fall back on tradition and stand fast on inaction. They are:
1. The group of ascetics or Brahmins which teaches and is of the view that all happiness, suffering and neutral feeling are entirely a result of kamma done in a previous time.
2. The group of ascetics and Brahmins which teaches and is of the view that all happiness, suffering and neutral feeling are entirely a result of the will of a Supreme Being.
3. The group of ascetics and Brahmins which teaches and is of the view that all happiness, suffering and neutral feeling are entirely without cause.
"Bhikkhus, of those three groups of ascetics and Brahmins, I approach the first group and ask, 'I hear that you uphold this teaching and view ... Is that so?' If those ascetics and Brahmins, on being thus questioned by me, answer that it is so, then I say to them, 'If that is so, then you have killed living beings as a result of kamma committed in a previous time, have stolen as a result of kamma done at a previous time, have engaged in sexual misconduct ... have uttered false speech ... have held wrong view as a result of kamma done in a previous time.'
"Bhikkhus, adhering to previously done kamma as the essence, there are neither motivation nor effort with what should be done and what should not be done ... Not upholding ardently what should be done, nor abandoning what should be abandoned, those ascetics and Brahmins are as if deluded, lacking control, incapable of having any true teaching. This is our legitimate refutation of the first group of ascetics and Brahmins holding these views."

Free Will in Buddhist Philosophy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#In_Buddhist_philosophy
"In Buddhism it is taught that the idea of absolute freedom of choice (i.e. that any human being could be completely free to make any choice) is foolish, because it denies the reality of one's physical needs and circumstances. Equally incorrect is the idea that we have no choice in life or that our lives are pre-determined. To deny freedom would be to deny the efforts of Buddhists to make moral progress (through our capacity to freely choose compassionate action). Pubbekatahetuvada, the belief that all happiness and suffering arise from previous actions, is considered a wrong view according to Buddhist doctrines. Because Buddhists also reject agenthood, the traditional compatibilist strategies are closed to them as well. Instead, the Buddhist philosophical strategy is to examine the metaphysics of causality. Ancient India had many heated arguments about the nature of causality with Jains, Nyayists, Samkhyists, Cārvākans, and Buddhists all taking slightly different lines. In many ways, the Buddhist position is closer to a theory of "conditionality" than a theory of "causality", especially as it is expounded by Nagarjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā."

Incorrect Understandings of Kamma in the Early Suttas:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karma_in_Buddhism
"In Buddhism, karma is not pre-determinism, fatalism or accidentalism, as all these ideas lead to inaction and destroy motivation and human effort. These ideas undermine the important concept that a human being can change for the better no matter what his or her past was, and they are designated as 'wrong views' in Buddhism. The Buddha identified three:
1. Pubbekatahetuvada: The belief that all happiness and suffering, including all future happiness and suffering, arise from previous karma, and human beings can exercise no volition to affect future results (Past-action determinism).
2. Issaranimmanahetuvada: The belief that all happiness and suffering are caused by the directives of a Supreme Being (Theistic determinism).
3. Ahetu-appaccaya-vaada: The belief that all happiness and suffering are random, having no cause (Indeterminism or Accidentalism).
Karma is continually ripening, but it is also continually being generated by present actions, therefore it is possible to exercise free will to shape future karma. P.A. Payutto writes, "the Buddha asserts effort and motivation as the crucial factors in deciding the ethical value of these various teachings on kamma."

I see you as proof that belief in pubbekatahetuvada, or fate, need not always lead to inaction and lack of motivation. Your court business makes me very happy.

from p.96 of Good, Evil and Beyond by Bhikkhu P.A. Payutto
"The following words from the Buddha clearly illustrate the Buddhist view:
“Listen, Sivaka. Some kinds of feeling arise with bile as condition … with changes in the weather as condition … with inconstant behavior as condition … with danger from an external source as condition … with kamma-results as condition. Any ascetic or Brahmin who is of the view that, ‘All feeling is entirely caused by previous kamma,’ I say is mistaken.”
These words discourage us from going too far with kamma by considering it as entirely a thing of the past. Such a view encourages inactivity; passively waiting for the results of old kamma to ripen and taking things as they come without thinking to correct or improve them. This is a harmful form of wrong view, as can be seen from the Buddha’s words above.
Significantly, in the above passage, the Buddha asserts effort and motivation as the crucial factors in deciding the ethical value of these various teachings on kamma.
The Buddha did not dismiss the importance of previous kamma, because it does play a part in the cause and effect process, and thus has an effect on the present in its capacity as one of the conditioning factors. But it is simply one of those conditions, it is not a supernatural force to be clung to or submitted to passively. An understanding of the Principle of Dependent Origination and the cause and effect process will clarify this.
For example, if a man climbs to the third floor of a building, it is undeniably true that his arriving is a result of past action – namely, walking up the stairs. And having arrived there, it is impossible for him to reach out and touch the ground with his hand, or to drive a car around. Obviously, this is because he has gone up to the third floor. Or, having arrived at the third floor, whether he is too exhausted to continue is also related to having walked up the stairs. His arrival there, the things he is able to do there and the situations he is likely to encounter, are all certainly related to the “old kamma” of having walked up the stairs. But exactly which actions he will perform, his reactions to the situations which he meets there, whether he will take a rest, walk on, or walk back down the stairs and out of that building, are all matters which he can decide for himself in that present moment, for which he will also reap the results. Even though the action of walking up the stairs may still be influencing him (for example, with his strength sapped he may be unable to function efficiently in any given situation), whether he decides to give in to that tiredness or try to overcome it are all matters which he can decide for himself in the present moment.
Therefore, old kamma should be understood in its relation to the whole cause and effect process. In terms of ethical practice, to understand the cause and effect process is to be able to learn from old kamma, understanding the situation at hand, and to skillfully make a plan of action for improving on and preparing for the future."

Good, Evil and Beyond: Kamma in the Buddha's Teaching

http://www.buddhanet.net/pdf_file/good_evil_beyond.pdf

"Choice"--the word--can be used with many different underlying beliefs.

Deuteronomy 30:19 (pre-Jesus?) "Choose Life!"

Did Jesus choose, even though he understood fate?

John 6:70: "Then Jesus replied, "Have I not chosen you, the Twelve? Yet one of you is a devil!"

Luke 10:21-22 "Jesus[...]said,[...]'and no one knows who the Father is except the Son and those to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.'"

John 7:16-17 "Jesus answered,[...]"If anyone chooses to do God's will, he will find out whether my teaching comes from God or whether I speak on my own."

John 15:15-17 "I no longer call you servants, because a servant does not know his master's business. Instead, I have called you friends, for everything that I learned from my Father I have made known to you. You did not choose me, but I CHOSE you and appointed you to go and bear fruit—fruit that will last. Then the Father will give you whatever you ask in my name. This is my command: Love each other."
[Love is the Law, Love under Will]

Matthew 12:17-18 "This was to fulfill what was spoken through the prophet Isaiah: "Here is my servant whom I have chosen,
the one I love, in whom I delight;"

Luke 6:13 "When morning came, he called his disciples to him and chose twelve of them, whom he also designated apostles."

There is 'do' and 'D.O.'

I had no choice but to choose to do my homework.

Found a source for one of the quotes above:
Devadaha Sutta
MN 101 (PTS: M ii 214)
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.101.than.html

It's much better with most of the ellipses filled in, including these two chunks:
"'Friend Niganthas [who preach pubbekatahetuvada], it's as if a man were shot with an arrow thickly smeared with poison. As a result of being shot with the arrow, he would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. His friends & companions, kinsmen & relatives would provide him with a surgeon. The surgeon would cut around the opening of the wound with a knife. As a result of the surgeon's cutting around the opening of the wound with a knife, the man would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. The surgeon would probe for the arrow with a probe. As a result of the surgeon's probing for the arrow with a probe, the man would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. The surgeon would then pull out the arrow. As a result of the surgeon's pulling out the arrow, the man would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. The surgeon would then apply a burning medicine to the mouth of the wound. As a result of the surgeon's applying a burning medicine to the mouth of the wound, the man would feel fierce, sharp, racking pains. But then at a later time, when the wound had healed and was covered with skin, he would be well & happy, free, master of himself, able to go wherever he liked. The thought would occur to him, "Before, I was shot with an arrow thickly smeared with poison. As a result of being shot with the arrow, I felt fierce, sharp, racking pains. My friends & companions, kinsmen & relatives provided me with a surgeon... The surgeon cut around the opening of the wound with a knife... probed for the arrow with a probe... pulled out the arrow... applied a burning medicine to the mouth of the wound. As a result of his applying a burning medicine to the mouth of the wound, I felt fierce, sharp, racking pains. But now that the wound is healed and covered with skin, I am well & happy, free, master of myself, able to go wherever I like."

"'In the same way, friend Niganthas, if you knew that you existed in the past, and that you did not not exist... if you knew what is the abandoning of unskillful mental qualities and the attainment of skillful mental qualities in the here-&-now, then — that being the case — it would be proper for you to assert that, "Whatever a person experiences — pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain — all is caused by what was done in the past." ...But because you do not know that you existed in the past... you do not know what is the abandoning of unskillful mental qualities and the attainment of skillful mental qualities in the here-&-now, then — that being the case — it is not proper for you to assert that, "Whatever a person experiences — pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain — all is caused by what was done in the past."

Dang, how you make me post here now!
Here's another response to "no 'do'"
from THE NIYAMA-DIPANI
by [Mahathera] Ledi Sayadaw
"Of The Standards of Truth
Our task here is to define the two categories under which all truths may be included: (1) The conventional (sammuti), and (2) the philosophic (paramattha) standard.

1. CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS
By this is meant a truth or fact, generally received as such by the common consent of mankind. What are the modes of conventional expressions? These are 'self', 'soul', 'being', 'person', woman, man, body, head, hand, leg, hair of the head, down on the body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, nerves, sinews, bone, etc.; the names of such external objects as tree, creeper, shrub, house, chariot, carriage, bed, seat, etc.

None of these are names of such 'really existent' dhamma (facts, phenomena, attributes) as mind, contact, extension, cohesion, etc. They are all names which denote as well as connote only some physical appearance and its persistence as such. These names and their connotation, therefore, having but a conventional significance, are called modes of conventional expression, i.e. terms in common use.

What constitutes the achievement or predication of conventional truth? 'The self is (exists)', 'the living soul is', 'a being is', 'the person is', etc. By adopting such words in common use a man becomes a conventional truth-speaker. And these are to be regarded as a correct mode of stating such truth. Why? Because otherwise constant disputes would result from want of a common language and common notions.

This is what is termed 'conventional truth'.

2. PHILOSOPHIC TRUTH
This is a tact or truth recognised from the philosophic point of view. What are the modes of philosophic expression? These are: 'mind', 'mental factor', 'matter', 'Nibbana', 'aggregates', elements', and so on.

These are not merely common or collective names, but imply something which really as such (sabhavato) exists. These are called the modes of 'highest', or 'ultimate matters', inasmuch as any import beyond that which they possess is inconceivable.

What constitutes the achievement or predication of philosophic truth? 'Consciousness exists', 'contact exists', 'feeling exists', 'extended quality exists', 'cohesion exists', 'Nibbana exists', and so on.

By expressing things as they exist in reality a man is a truth-speaker. Such speech is also to be regarded as a correct mode of stating truth. Why? Because it helps us to avoid falling into the errors of recognition, sense-consciousness and illusory opinions.

This is what is termed 'philosophic truth'. It should be noted in this connexion that 'conventional truth' provides a safeguard against falsehood, and 'philosophic truth' guards against hallucination. Thus, when a man from the conventional point of view states 'the self, the soul, the being, the person exists', etc., he is not to be considered as uttering falsehoods, whether the import of what he affirms is really true or not, whether it rests upon valid speculation or self. Why? Because, in such a case, there is no fraudulent motive. But it comes within the province of hallucinations. Why? Because in these cases the things that are of 'the nature of 'not self' are taken as of 'self', and stated as such. From the philosophical point of view there is nothing of 'self'. There are only dhamma. And none of these is of the nature of 'self'. They are, on the contrary, of the nature of 'not-self', etc. And when a man speaks like this his words show neither falsehood nor hallucination. So we read in the Pali texts: 'These, bhikkhus, are the four cases of hallucination. What are the four? The impermanent is taken as permanent.' This is the first point involved in hallucinations of recognition, sense consciousness and illusory opinion. 'That which is ill is taken as weal. That which is not-self is taken as self. The ugly and offensive is taken as beautiful and beneficial.' These are the remaining three cases of the hallucinations of recognition, sense-consciousness and illusory opinion.

Here the expression 'The impermanent' implies the psychical and physical facts and conditions that are summed up in the term 'name and form', and which are by nature impermanent. The expression 'that which is ill' implies the facts of common experience that are categorised under the 'truth regarding ill'. The expression 'the not self' implies all that which is of the nature of 'not-self'. And the expression 'the ugly and offensive' implies the psycho-physical condition that fall under 'the truth regarding ill' and are, therefore, a fortiori considered to be 'ugly and offensive'.

By viewing 'name-and-form' in the light of 'being', 'person', a man takes what is impermanent as permanent. Why? Because 'being'or person' is nothing but a concept. And a concept, as we know, has not the attribute of passing away or moving about.

On the other hand, when it is said that a being, on coming into form of existence, is himself born, that at the end of life he himself dies, that even before he took on to himself the present form of existence, he had come from this or that form of first existence, and that after death he would be re-born into this or that form of future existence, it shows that the being is viewed as engaged in 'going'.

It is for these reasons that, by viewing 'name-and-form' in the light of 'being', 'person', a man takes what is impermanent as permanent

By holding dear and agreeable that which is merely a mental and bodily phenomenon liable to the facts of misery, a man takes that which is ill as weal, that which is ugly and offensive as beautiful and beneficial.

'Being' is a mere 'concept'. There is no corresponding thing in nature. When such a really non-existent is regarded as really existent, the result thereof is that mere name-and-form is made the essence of a being. And by holding that it is the self of a being, not only that, the being himself, a man takes what is not-self as self.

It is said that a man sees objects through his eyes. Here seeing means visual cognition. The gaze is fixed upon a material form as the object of that cognition. And the form is a visible and tangible phenomenon, and neither the being nor the person. A man, having seen such a form, contemplates it in his mind as a being, a woman, a head, a face, a tree, a chariot, a carriage. This is the error of cognitive consciousness originating from seeing. A similar explanation can hold true of such an error as originates from hearing, etc. But the question as to the error that originates from the mind co-ordinating sensations is rather intricate, though of pressing importance.

According as an object is discerned by the mind, it is marked or fixed by recognition. Later on it may cause bewilderment and confusion. 'This is what is called the hallucination of recognition.

According as a man apprehends a thing through the understanding, he speculates upon it:--'Beings, etc., have a self.' 'It is like this and that.' 'There is a living soul.' 'It is such and such.' This is what is termed the hallucination of illusory opinion.

In the Pali texts, the hallucination of recognition as being very obvious is mentioned first. But it may follow the hallucination of opinion. And these three forms of hallucination are rooted in 'ignorance', that is to say, they originate from it. Of these, the first two forms of hallucination have a bearing upon the, immoral type of worldly consciousness. Craving, conceit, and false notions spring from them. By taking his stand upon philosophical truth, a man can discern the nature of hallucinations; and having ascertained what that is, he can give them up for ever."

...and another:
Sivaka Sutta: SN 36.21 (PTS: S iv 230)
"[Translator's note: Some people have interpreted this sutta as stating that there are many experiences that cannot be explained by the principle of kamma. A casual glance of the alternative factors here — drawn from the various causes for pain that were recognized in the medical treatises of his time — would seem to support this conclusion. However, if we compare this list with his definition of old kamma in SN 35.145, we see that many of the alternative causes are actually the result of past actions. Those that aren't are the result of new kamma. For instance, MN 101 counts asceticism — which produces pain in the immediate present — under the factor harsh treatment. The point here is that old and new kamma do not override other causal factors operating in the universe — such as those recognized by the physical sciences — but instead find their expression within those factors. A second point is that some of the influences of past kamma can be mitigated in the present — a disease caused by bile, for instance, can be cured by medicine that brings the bile back to normal. Similarly with the mind: suffering caused by physical pain can be ended by understanding and abandoning the attachment that led to that suffering. In this way, the Buddha's teaching on kamma avoids determinism and opens the way for a path of practice focused on eliminating the causes of suffering in the here and now."